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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                               
 
  
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
         This appeal presents a series of jurisdictional questions.  The 
underlying dispute is 
a state law claim involving a mortgage foreclosure action.  It gained 
entry to the federal system 
via the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. 
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), which extends federal jurisdiction to 
"any civil action, suit, 
or proceeding to which the [Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)] is a 
party."  12 U.S.C. § 
1441a(l)(1).  Invoking this provision, the RTC filed suit in federal 
court, seeking foreclosure and 
related relief on various mortgages.  The RTC subsequently sold its 
interest in the underlying 
loans and was dismissed from the case.  The district court entered summary 
judgment against the 
debtor, who appeals on the ground that federal jurisdiction failed when 
the RTC was dismissed. 
         We will consider in turn the three jurisdictional issues raised 
by the parties.  We 
begin by rejecting a mootness challenge to our appellate jurisdiction.  We 
next determine that we 
do not have continuing jurisdiction under § 1441a(l)(1).  We then reject 
the invocation of the 
"black letter rule" that jurisdiction is only determined at the time of 
the filing of the complaint.  
We conclude, however, by looking to the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
Because we find that this particular case should fall within the 
supplemental jurisdiction of the 
district court, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment, even though 
we found that 
jurisdiction under § 1441a(l)(1) had terminated. 
                               I. 
         On December 23, 1987, Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 
("Preferred Entity") 
and DAML Realty Corp. ("DAML") executed and delivered to BRT Realty Trust 
("BRT") five 
promissory notes in the original amounts of $67,965,270; $9,447,920; 
$2,880,151; $706,659; and 
$4,000,000.  These notes were secured by mortgages on tracts of land in 
New Jersey and New 
York.  On the same date, BRT assigned a 95% interest in the loan to 
FarWest Savings and Loan 
Association ("FarWest"). 
         The Notes and Mortgages contained clauses providing for 
acceleration and 
foreclosure in the event of default.  On or about March 1, 1991, Preferred 
Entity and DAML 
defaulted on their obligations.  Meanwhile, on February 15, 1991, the RTC 
had been appointed 
receiver for FarWest.  On June 18, 1991, BRT and the RTC filed an action 
in the Superior Court 
of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Hudson County, seeking foreclosure and 
related relief on the 
mortgages secured by New Jersey property. 
         On September 23, 1992, the RTC acquired BRT's remaining 5% 
interest in the 
loan.  The RTC then dismissed the New Jersey action and, on July 30, 1993, 
filed this suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Jurisdiction 
rested on 12 U.S.C. § 
1441a(l), which grants the federal courts jurisdiction over any proceeding 
to which the RTC is a 
party. 
         No discovery or further action took place.  On October 5, 1994, 
New Rock Asset 
Partners, L.P., ("New Rock") acquired all of the RTC's right, title, and 
interest in the loans and 
mortgages.  On December 9, 1994, New Rock filed an Amended Complaint 
stating, inter alia: 
                   1.  The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant 
to the 
                   Financial Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989, 12 U.S.C. § 
                   1441a(l). 
                        . . . . 
                        3.  Plaintiff, New Rock, is the sole owner and 
holder of all right, 
                   title and interest in the Indebtedness (as defined 
herein) and the right to 
                   repayment thereof, together with all of the collateral 
security granted for 
                   repayment of the Indebtedness, pursuant to the Mortgage 
Assignments (as 
                   defined herein). 
                        . . . . 
                        31.  New Rock has succeeded to all of RTC's right, 
title and 
                   interest in the Rent Order [obtained against defendants 
in a previous state 
                   court action]. 
     App. at 28-29, 35.  On December 14, 1994, New Rock obtained an order 
substituting itself as 
plaintiff and dismissing the RTC from the case. 
         Two day later, New Rock moved for partial summary judgment and 
final 
judgment of foreclosure.  Preferred Entity responded by contesting subject 
matter jurisdiction 
and the certifications on which New Rock based its summary judgment 
motion.  New Rock then 
supplemented its motion with additional certifications.  The district 
court denied Preferred 
Entity's jurisdictional challenge and granted New Rock's summary judgment 
motion.  Preferred 
Entity appealed. 
         Since the filing of the appeal, New Rock has executed on its 
judgment and 
purchased the New Jersey property at a sheriff's sale conducted on August 
10, 1995, by the 
Sheriff's Office for Hudson County.  New Rock is currently pursuing 
various actions in New 
York state courts to foreclose on the New York properties. 
                               II. 
         The propriety of federal court jurisdiction forms the nub of this 
case.  The district 
court asserted jurisdiction based solely on 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l).  We 
exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over the district court's judgment and final order pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of the district court's jurisdictional determinations is plenary.  
Wujick v. Dale & Dale, 
Inc., 43 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir. 1994). 
                               III. 
                               A. 
         We will first address New Rock's argument that this appeal has 
been "mooted in 
part" because the subject property has been purchased at foreclosure sale 
and the validity of the 
foreclosure sale can no longer be disputed.  New Rock combines this 
argument with a citation to 
our decision in National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int'l, Inc., 983 F.2d 
485 (3d Cir. 1992), 
contending that this appeal is not moot as to the judgement's collateral 
estoppel and res judicata 
effects.  This "moot in part, yet not moot in part" argument represents a 
fundamental 
misunderstanding of mootness doctrine and National Iranian Oil.  We will 
attempt to clarify the 
matter. 
         In arguing mootness because of the foreclosure sale, New Rock 
relies on a 
Seventh Circuit case, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260 
(7th Cir. 1986), which 
states the rule in the Seventh Circuit:  "In the absence of a stay of the 
enforcement of a judgment, 
if a district court judgment authorizes the sale of property and the 
property is sold to a good faith 
purchaser during the pendency of the appeal, the sale of property moots 
the appeal . . .."  Id. at 
1263.  In the case before us, foreclosure and sale have taken place.  New 
Rock contends that this 
aspect of the appeal is therefore moot.  We do not agree.  
         We in the Third Circuit have never addressed the issue of whether 
foreclosure and 
sale, purely and simply, would render an appeal moot.  It is possible that 
we might come to that 
conclusion in an appropriate case after examining the full effects on the 
dispute of such a 
foreclosure and sale.  But, before so concluding, our precedents require 
that we first determine if 
there is still the possibility of granting any effective relief.  See 
National Iranian Oil, 983 F.2d at 
489 ("A case is not moot if there is a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief 
through a decree of conclusive character") (citations omitted); In re 
Joshua Slocum, Ltd., 922 
F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to moot appeal in landlord-
tenant dispute where 
landlord failed to obtain stay; court could still grant effective relief); 
Main Line Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Tri-Kell, Inc., 721 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1983) ("the 
determination that a case is 
moot requires that there be nothing gained by reaching a decision"); see 
also New Jersey 
Turnpike Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 
1985) (discussing 
mootness in terms of inability to grant effective relief).  If effective 
relief can be granted, then 
this appeal is not moot. 
         We have commented in dictum on the possibility of effective 
relief remaining 
when a party has challenged a court's jurisdiction over a judgment used to 
foreclose property.  In 
Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Lai, 973 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1992), we rejected the 
plaintiff's contention 
that because money that the defendant had posted in lieu of a supersedeas 
bond had been 
disbursed, meaningful relief was precluded and the defendant's appeal was 
moot.  We noted that 
if the state court order was improper and void ab initio, then the 
defendant could seek to "undo 
the harm it suffered."  Id. at 1128.  We analogized the defendant's 
position  
              to that of an appellant who has not obtained a stay of 
execution on the 
                   underlying judgment pending appeal when the appellee 
executes on its 
                   judgment while the appeal is pending.  The execution 
does not render the 
                   appeal moot since a reversal would allow the appellant 
to seek either a 
                   money judgment or return of the funds or property 
seized in the execution. 
     Id. at 1129.  This situation is similar to the case before us. 
         Applying the effective relief test, we have little difficulty 
finding this appeal 
justiciable.  If the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
its order were void ab 
initio, then as indicated in Raymark, Preferred Entity could seek a 
variety of relief both by 
attempting to recover damages for the seizure of the New Jersey property 
and by resisting the 
foreclosure action in New York.  Given this potential for an effective 
remedy, the current appeal 
is not moot. 
         Because we find that the foreclosure sale has not mooted the 
appeal, we do not 
need to address New Rock's "partial mootness" theory.  New Rock would have 
us moot the 
propriety of the district court's granting of summary judgment while still 
giving collateral 
estoppel effect to that judgment.  We do not wish impliedly to give our 
stamp of approval to such 
a concept.  We will therefore briefly point out the invalidity of the 
theory. 
         In making its argument on "partial mootness," New Rock points to 
language in 
National Iranian Oil which supports its position that a judgment having 
possible collateral legal 
consequences, including collateral estoppel effect in similar actions, is 
not moot.  983 F.2d at 
490.  The problem with New Rock's argument is that the example of 
collateral estoppel is only 
one of several examples that we gave in National Iranian Oil of effects, 
such as a viable claim for 
damages or a likelihood that the parties will relitigate the same issue, 
that will support a finding 
that a matter is not moot.  If any one of these factors is established, 
the entire judgment is saved 
from mootness.  It is not just a portion of the judgment which survives.  
If, however, the appeal is 
moot, it is entirely moot and it will have no res judicata effect.  Id. at 
489 (citing United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-41 (1950); Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West 
Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d 
127, 130 (3d Cir. 1991)).   
         The need that a judgment have a res judicata effect may be enough 
to support a 
determination that a judgment is not moot.  We recognized in National 
Iranian Oil that such a 
need for preclusive effect may be a sufficient reason to reject mootness.  
983 F.2d at 490.  
However, if we come to such a conclusion, i.e., that we will reject 
mootness so that a judgment 
has res judicata effect, then a fortiori the entire matter is not moot.  
New Rock cannot have a res 
judicata effect to assist it in the New York foreclosure actions and at 
the same time have a 
declaration that the granting of summary judgment by the district court, 
or the propriety of that 
judgment, is moot.  A case is either moot or not.  Because the potential 
for effective relief 
remains, this case is not moot. 
                                B. 
         We now turn to the central jurisdictional issues raised in this 
appeal. 
                                1.      
         Preferred Entity challenges the district court's granting of 
summary judgment 
based on the absence of federal jurisdiction.  New Rock's sole asserted 
basis for jurisdiction is 12 
U.S.C. § 1441a(l), which grants the federal courts original jurisdiction 
over any case to which the 
RTC is a party.  Preferred Entity argues that because New Rock intervened 
in the suit and filed 
an amended complaint naming itself as sole plaintiff, the RTC is no longer 
a party to the action 
and § 1441a(l) cannot support jurisdiction.  Although this question 
presents a difficult problem of 
statutory interpretation, we conclude that Preferred Entity is correct in 
its reading of § 1441a(l). 
         Preferred Entity's contention forces us to explore a gray area of 
FIRREA 
jurisdiction.  It seems clear that jurisdiction under § 1441a(l) would not 
attach had the RTC sold 
the loans to New Rock before litigation or had New Rock filed its own 
action.  In such a 
scenario, the RTC would never have been a party to the case, and the RTC 
cannot pass its 
jurisdictional rights by contract.  It seems equally clear that federal 
jurisdiction would attach if 
the RTC had remained a party to the case, regardless of its capacity.  
Spring Garden Assoc., L.P. 
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 26 F.3d 412, 415-17 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding 
jurisdiction where RTC 
substituted itself for defendant and removed entire action to federal 
court); Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 62, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding jurisdiction 
where RTC substituted 
itself for plaintiff and removed after state court judgment had been 
appealed).  The issue is 
therefore whether § 1441a(l) provides for continuing jurisdiction where 
the RTC was once a 
party but has since been dropped from the case. 
         This question raises a matter of first impression for this 
circuit.  Indeed, few 
courts have ever considered it.  Of the federal appellate tribunals, only 
the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has addressed the issue.  Federal Sav. & 
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 
935 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992).  Several 
district courts have 
reached it, including the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Skaro v. 
Eastern Sav. Bank, 866 F. 
Supp. 229 (W.D. Pa. 1994).  Skaro relied almost exclusively on Griffin, as 
did the district court 
here.  By contrast, in Mill Investments, Inc. v. Brooks Woolen Co., Inc., 
797 F. Supp. 49 (D. Me. 
1992), the United States District Court for the District of Maine 
discussed Griffin thoroughly and 
reached contrary conclusions.  After conducting our own independent 
analysis of the matter, we 
find that we disagree with Griffin and agree with Mill Investments. 
         The scope of § 1441a(l) presents a question of statutory 
interpretation.  This 
process begins with the plain language of the statute.  Santa Fe Medical 
Services, Inc. v. Segal 
(In re Segal), 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 1995); Spring Garden, 26 F.3d at 
415; see United States 
Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1994).  "Where . . 
. the statute's language 
is plain, 'the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to 
its terms.'"  United States v. 
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. 
United States, 242 U.S. 
470, 485 (1917)).  Plain meaning is conclusive, "except in the 'rare cases 
[in which] the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its 
drafters.'"  Id. at 242 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 
U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
         In determining the plain meaning of FIRREA, we have consistently 
looked to its 
legislative history.  Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 
907, 911 (3d Cir. 1990); 
see Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Conn., N.A., 43 F.3d 
843, 849 n.14 (3d 
Cir. 1994) ("As this is a matter of statutory construction, consideration 
of the legislative history 
would be appropriate.").  We have also examined "the atmosphere in which 
[the statute] was 
enacted."  Carteret Savings Bank, F.A. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 
963 F.2d 567, 574 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  Only if the plain language of the statute remains ambiguous 
after these steps will we 
"resort to other rules of statutory construction . . .."  Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 
62, 64 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding ambiguity in removal provision of § 
1441a(l)(3)(A) and (C)).  
    These principles establish the requisite steps in our inquiry.  We 
note at the outset 
that we reach our conclusion based on plain meaning.  We find neither a 
"literal application of 
the statute [that] would produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters," 
Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. at 242, nor an ambiguity that forces us to 
invoke general canons of 
statutory construction, Nernberg, 3 F.3d at 64.   
    We begin with the provision itself.  Both the initial and amended 
complaints 
ground jurisdiction with a general cite to § 1441a(l).  This section, 
entitled "Power to remove; 
jurisdiction," contains three parts.  Section 1441a(l)(1) sets out a 
general jurisdictional grant 
creating original jurisdiction in the federal courts.  Section 1441a(l)(2) 
provides for substitution 
of the RTC as a party for the RTC's predecessors in thrift supervision, 
the now-defunct Federal 
Saving and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"), the equally defunct 
Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board ("FHLBB"), and the reconstituted and redirected Federal Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation ("FDIC").  Section 1441a(l)(3) sets forth specific procedures 
for removing actions 
from state court where the RTC is a party.  The vast majority of case law 
addresses this final 
provision.  See, e.g., Wujick v. Dale & Dale, Inc., 43 F.3d 790, 792-94 
(3d Cir. 1994) 
(addressing jurisdictional sufficiency of removal by RTC; dismissing claim 
against RTC due to 
plaintiff's failure to exhaust remedies). 
    Despite New Rock's general citation to § 1441a(l), neither part (2) 
nor part (3) is 
relevant.  The RTC began the case as a party, obviating the need for § 
1441a(l)(2).  The case was 
originally filed in federal court, eliminating the need for § 1441a(l)(3).  
This case turns on § 
1441a(l)(1).   
    Section 1441a(l)(1) states: 
    (1) In general 
         Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, any civil  action, 
suit, or 
    proceeding to which the [RTC] is a party shall be deemed to arise 
under the laws 
    of the United States, and the United States district courts shall have 
original 
    jurisdiction over such action, suit, or proceeding. 
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1). 
    Preferred Entity contends that the plain language of § 1441a(l)(1) 
provides for 
jurisdiction only over cases where the RTC is a party but not where it was 
a party.  In the current 
action, the RTC transferred its loans to New Rock, the court dismissed the 
RTC from the case, 
and New Rock filed an amended complaint naming itself as the sole 
plaintiff.  Preferred Entity 
contends that the RTC consequently is no longer a party and jurisdiction 
no longer exists. 
    New Rock argues instead that the case is controlled by the principle 
that 
jurisdiction is determined at the time the action is commenced, both as a 
matter of statutory 
interpretation and, as discussed in Part III.B.2, a matter of black letter 
law.  Under § 1441a(l)(1), 
this result is obtained by reading the statute to create federal 
jurisdiction which, once established 
at the outset by the presence of the RTC as a party, continues throughout 
the litigation, whether 
or not the RTC remains as a party. 
    We can divine no conclusive method of deciding between the two 
alternative 
readings of § 1441a(l)(1) from the text of the statute alone.  Cf. Hudson 
United Bank, 43 F.3d at 
849 ("It is true that FIRREA is awkwardly written and difficult to 
interpret.").  Nevertheless, we 
find Preferred Entity's reading more persuasive.  It encompasses the 
presence of the RTC as a 
party.  Moreover, it reads the statute narrowly rather than expansively.  
See discussion, infra.  
Were we forced to rely solely on the words of the statute, we would agree 
with Preferred Entity.  
But other sources remain. 
         Following Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co. and Hudson 
United Bank, 
we next turn to legislative history to clarify plain meaning.  
Unfortunately, the legislative history 
of § 1441a(l)(1) provides minimal assistance.  The current provision 
became law as 1989 Pub. L. 
No. 101-73 § 53(l)(1), 103 Stat. 389.  The House Report's lone comment 
reads:   
          
              Subsection (o) [sic.] provides that suits by or against the 
RTC shall arise 
                   under the laws of the United States and can be removed 
to the District 
                   Court of the District of Columbia or if the suit arises 
out of actions by the 
                   RTC with respect to an institution for which a 
conservator or receiver has 
                   been appointed in the district court in which the 
institution's principal 
                   place of business is located.  
     H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I), 101st Congress, 1st Sess. 362 (1989), 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
86, 158.  This passage does little more than reiterate the language of the 
bill and demonstrate that 
the provision was concerned first and foremost with removal.  The 
substitution of the phrase "by 
or against the RTC" provides some support for the narrow reading proposed 
by Preferred Entity, 
but the same arguments for competing interpretations apply.  Like the 
plain language of the 
statute, the legislative history favors Preferred Entity, but only 
slightly. 
         Stronger support for a narrow reading flows from the next source 
to which we 
have looked in interpreting FIRREA, "the atmosphere in which [the statute] 
was enacted."  
Carteret Savings, 963 F.2d at 574.  Carteret describes that atmosphere.  
                   In 1989, the thrift industry was in crisis.  As the 
House Report 
                   noted, "[t]he nation's thrift industry and its deposit 
insurance fund, the 
                   [FSLIC] are currently in precarious financial condition 
and consumer 
                   confidence in the savings and loan industry is waning."  
H.R. Rep. No. 54, 
                   101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 302 (1989), reprinted 
in 1989 
                   U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 98.  The 2,949 FSLIC-insured savings 
institutions 
                   holding deposits of $971 billion and assets of $1.35 
trillion lost $12.1 
                   billion in 1988.  Id. at 303, reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 99.  The 
                   FSLIC was in a combined deficit position of at least 
$56 billion by the end 
                   of 1988.  Id. at 304, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
100.  Rapidly 
                   declining consumer confidence led to record deposit 
withdrawals by 
                   consumers.  Id. at 305, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 101.  Congress 
                   believed that the Bank Board, inter alia, had 
repeatedly understated the 
                   magnitude of the problem.  Id. 
     Id. at 574-75. 
         In this atmosphere of crisis, Congress passed FIRREA to serve 
several important 
purposes.  As framed by the statute, these purposes included:  "(7) To 
establish a new 
corporation, to be known as the Resolution Trust Corporation, to contain, 
manage, and resolve 
failed savings associations."  1989 Pub. L. No. 101-73 § 101, 103 Stat. 
187.  The House Report 
stated this goal in more general terms:  "The primary purposes of [FIRREA] 
are to . . . establish 
organizations and procedures to obtain and administer the necessary 
funding to resolve failed 
thrift cases and to dispose of the assets of these institutions . . . and, 
enhance the regulatory 
enforcement powers of the depositor institution regulatory agencies . . 
.."  H.R. Rep. No. 101- 
54(I), 101st Congress, 1st Sess. 308 (1989), reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 104.  To serve 
these purposes, FIRREA established the RTC "to manage and dispose of 
assets acquired from 
failed thrifts."  Id. 
         Although not expressly discussed in the legislative history, § 
1441a(l)(1)'s grant 
of federal jurisdiction relates to these purposes in obvious ways.  It 
gives the RTC the benefit of 
a federal forum and a uniform body of federal law for its receivership 
activities.  The federal 
forum is also a boon to the RTC both in pursuing claims and defending 
actions against the thrifts 
over which it had assumed control.  The broader scope of a federal remedy 
similarly boosts the 
RTC's enforcement authority.  Federal jurisdiction thus helps the RTC 
"manage and dispose of 
assets acquired from failed thrifts."  Id. 
         The role of federal jurisdiction in assisting the RTC in its 
management role and in 
disposing of thrift assets also indicates that once this has been 
accomplished, the reasons for 
federal jurisdiction end.  Once the RTC has successfully managed a thrift 
and either restored it to 
solvency or transferred its assets to willing buyers, the agency's role--
and hence the logic of 
jurisdiction--no longer exists.  This reading indicates why the terms of 
the statute limit federal 
jurisdiction to cases in which the RTC "is a party."  The RTC will 
presumably only be a party 
where it is engaged in active management and disposal of thrifts and 
thrift assets.  The RTC will 
no longer be a party--and jurisdiction will no longer apply--once the RTC 
has managed a thrift 
and its assets have been disposed. 
         The atmosphere surrounding FIRREA and the purposes of the statute 
thus provide 
additional support for Preferred Entity's reading of § 1441a(l)(1).  Once 
New Rock became "the 
sole owner and holder of all right, title and interest in the 
Indebtedness," and once it "succeeded 
to all of RTC's right, title and interest in the Rent Order [obtained 
against defendants in a 
previous state court action]," the RTC's interest in the loans had been 
managed and disposed.  
The RTC no longer had any role in the action, and the agency was dropped 
from the case.  
Similarly, there was no longer any reason for federal jurisdiction, and § 
1441a(l)(1)'s power 
lapsed.  Given the purposes of FIRREA, Preferred Entity's jurisdictional 
stance is correct. 
         Based on the language of § 1441a(l)(1), its legislative history, 
and the background 
and purpose of FIRREA, we conclude that the plain meaning of the statute 
precludes continuing 
jurisdiction over an action where the RTC is no longer a party.  Section 
1441a(l)(1) will not 
support jurisdiction in this case. 
         In Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691 (5th 
Cir. 1991), the 
Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.  Griffin involved a similar 
scenario in which the 
FSLIC, acting as receiver for a failed thrift, removed a contract action 
to federal court.  With the 
passage of FIRREA, the FDIC replaced the FSLIC.  Jurisdiction was based on 
12 U.S.C. § 1819, 
the FDIC's jurisdictional provision corresponding to the RTC's § 1441a(l).  
See Spring Garden, 
26 F.3d at 416 n.7 (noting parallels between statutes); Nernberg, 3 F.3d 
at 66 n.2 (same).  The 
FDIC assigned the contract action to a thrift that had acquired the assets 
and liabilities of the 
failed institution, after which it "apparently no longer pursu[ed] any 
claims."  935 F.2d at 694.  
This left the thrift and the private defendant as the only parties.  
Griffin nevertheless asserted 
jurisdiction. 
         Griffin based its conclusion primarily on policy concerns.  
Without citation to 
caselaw or legislative history, the court concluded that   
              policy reasons for insuring federal jurisdiction over cases 
involving the 
                   actions of failed thrifts continue when the FDIC is 
voluntarily dismissed 
                   as a party and the owner of the failed thrift's assets 
remains.  A transferee 
                   from FSLIC or FDIC, as successor of their interests, is 
still entitled to the 
                   protection of federal courts applying D'Oench Duhme, 
even when FSLIC 
                   or FDIC is voluntarily dismissed. 
     935 F.2d at 696.   
         In response to Griffin, the district court in Mill Investments, 
Inc. v. Brooks 
Woolen Co., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 49 (D. Me. 1992), explored the policies 
behind FIRREA's 
jurisdictional grant and reached the same conclusions about its plain 
meaning that we have 
reached here: 
              FIRREA was enacted to deal with a banking crisis and "to 
smooth the 
                   modalities by which rehabilitation might be 
accomplished."  Serge 
                   Marquis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 965 F.2d at 
1154.  It is clear 
                   to the Court that this policy is not advanced in any 
significant way by 
                   retaining federal jurisdiction once the failed bank's 
assets have been 
                   assigned to a private company.  The expanded federal 
jurisdiction and 
                   other procedural protections of FIRREA may 
"tremendously increase the 
                   FDIC's ability to carry out its regulatory and 
enforcement responsibilities 
                   under FIRREA."  Matter of Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 
519 (5th Cir. 
                   1992).  While the procedural protections also allow, 
"the FDIC to 
                   effectively and aggressively protect a failed bank's 
interests and assets," id.at 519-20, it can no longer do so when it is no 
longer a party to the case 
                   and when those assets have successfully been assigned 
to another.  In 
                   essence, one of the goals of the statute has been 
achieved on a micro level 
                   once the assets have been assigned. 
     797 F. Supp. at 53-54.  We agree.  Contrary to Griffin's naked 
assertion, the policy reasons for 
federal jurisdiction end when the FDIC or RTC leaves the case. 
         Mill Investments also dealt with Griffin's claim that the need 
for federal 
enforcement of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine supported jurisdiction.  
"D'Oench, Duhme is a 
federal estoppel doctrine which prohibits borrowers or guarantors from 
using secret or 
unrecorded side agreements to defend against efforts by FDIC or its 
assignees to collect on 
promissory notes it has acquired from a failed bank."  Id. at 54 (citation 
omitted); see generallyAdams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 937 F.2d 845, 
852-54 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing 
D'Oench Duhme).  The Mill Investments court saw no reason why state courts 
could not enforce 
these defenses.  797 F. Supp. at 54.  We also have faith in the competence 
of state tribunals.  
Griffin's D'Oench, Duhme policy rationale is not convincing. 
         As a result, we find Griffin's position on § 1441a(l)(1) 
unpersuasive.  By contrast, 
our reading of the statute is consistent with the purpose of FIRREA as 
expressed in the statute 
and its legislative history.  We also note that our reading is consistent 
with general policies 
underlying federal jurisdiction.  These principles include the limited 
nature of federal jurisdiction 
and the goal of not interfering in the business of the states. 
         The limited nature of federal jurisdiction needs little 
discussion.  This principle 
marks a fundamental precept of the American court system.  Owen Equip. & 
Erection Co. v. 
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).  Interpreting § 1441a(l)(1) narrowly 
comports with this 
general rule.  See Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(interpreting narrowly 
jurisdiction under Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Sheets, 313 
U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (interpreting jurisdictional statute narrowly).   
         A narrow reading of § 1441a(l)(1) also comports with the need to 
avoid 
interfering in state court matters.  In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., ___ 
U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 
1757 (1994), the Supreme Court recognized this interest in considering the 
impact of a federal 
bankruptcy provision on state foreclosure law: 
              Federal statutes impinging on important state interests 
cannot be construed 
                   without regard to the implications of our dual system 
of government.  
                   When the Federal Government takes over local radiations 
in the vast 
                   network of our national economic enterprise and thereby 
radically 
                   readjusts the balance of state and national authority, 
those charged with the 
                   duty of legislating must be reasonably explicit.  It is 
beyond question that 
                   an essential state interest is at issue [in property 
foreclosures] . . ..  To 
                   displace traditional State regulation in such a manner, 
the federal statutory 
                   purpose must be clear and manifest.  Otherwise, the 
[statute] will be 
                   construed to adopt, rather than to displace, pre-
existing state law. 
     Id. at 1764-65 (citations and alterations omitted). 
         We have previously expressed similar concerns about § 1441a(l). 
              We note with some uneasiness that . . . the Resolution Trust 
removal 
                   statute does not exclude [purely state law] cases.  The 
language of the 
                   statute thus allows Resolution Trust to remove routine 
collection and 
                   foreclosure cases to the already overburdened federal 
courts.  . . . It is a 
                   serious question whether such litigation is properly 
the[ir] role. 
     Nernberg, 3 F.3d at 68 n.3.  In this passage, we were commenting on 
post-judgment removal 
from state court where the RTC had been substituted as a party.  In such a 
scenario, the RTC 
becomes an active participant in the case, injecting a federal element and 
creating a basis for 
removal.  We nonetheless questioned the role of the federal courts in 
resolving such a dispute. 
         The concerns expressed in Nernberg are equally appropriate and 
even accentuated 
in the current context, where the RTC was once a party to the case but has 
now been dismissed, 
leaving a purely state law matter.  Extending jurisdiction to federalize 
this class of foreclosure 
actions absent a "clear and manifest" legislative intent would conflict 
with the Supreme Court's 
ruling in BFP.  114 S.Ct at 1765.  Our examination of the plain meaning of 
§ 1441a(l)(1) shows 
that no such "clear and manifest" intent exists.  Our interpretation of 
the statute thus coheres with 
the federal goal of avoiding interference in state concerns. 
         For these reasons, we conclude that once the RTC left the case, § 
1441a(l)(1) 
could no longer support federal jurisdiction.  We will reverse the 
district court's exercise of 
jurisdiction pursuant to this provision. 
                                2. 
         Having determined that the language of § 1441a(l)(1) will not 
support continuing 
jurisdiction, we must next address New Rock's argument that the "black 
letter rule" that 
jurisdiction is determined at the time of filing preserves jurisdiction 
after the RTC's dismissal.  
We disagree. 
         The principle that jurisdiction is determined at the outset of 
the action is simply 
insufficient to support the continuing applicability of § 1441a(l)(1) to 
this case.  One basic 
difficulty with this argument is that the letter and spirit of the rule 
apply most clearly to diversity 
cases.  The Supreme Court set out the rule in the diversity context.  St. 
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. 
v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 286, 290-92 (1938).  In addition, the Court 
crafted the rule for the 
removal of actions from state court, which involves a more lenient 
standard not relevant here.  Id.  
Most importantly, the policies behind removal and the risks of 
manipulative behavior played a 
significant role in the Court's decision.  St. Paul focused primarily on 
the monetary threshold for 
federal jurisdiction, observing that the time of filing rule prevented 
plaintiffs from subsequently 
amending their complaint to plead a lesser amount and avoid removal.  Id. 
at 294.  Similar 
concerns applied to changes of parties that would potentially destroy 
diversity of citizenship.  Id.at 294-95.  From the outset, the underlying 
concern of the time of filing rule was the risk that 
parties would deploy procedural tactics to manipulate federal 
jurisdiction. 
         The rule that jurisdiction is assessed at the time of the filing 
of the complaint has 
been applied only rarely to federal question cases.  Moreover, in these 
rare cases, the rule has 
often been applied axiomatically, without extensive discussion or 
analysis.  See Rosa v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 392 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 981 (1991); see 
also F. Alderete General Contractors, Inc., 715 F.2d 1476, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (observing in 
government contracts action that "the decision below is at variance with 
the long-standing rule in 
the Federal courts that jurisdiction is determined at the time the suit is 
filed and, after vesting, 
cannot be ousted by subsequent events, including action by the parties").  
Even in the federal 
question context, however, the focus of the time of filing rule has been 
on preventing 
manipulation of jurisdiction when a claim is removed.  As we observed in 
Westmoreland 
Hospital Ass'n v. Blue Cross of Western Pa., "a subsequent amendment to 
the complaint after 
removal designed to eliminate the federal claim will not defeat federal 
jurisdiction."  605 F.2d 
119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 
(1980).  Along with the 
obvious goal of judicial efficiency, we perceive the risk of strategic 
behavior as the primary 
rationale behind the time of filing rule. 
         Manipulation of jurisdiction is simply not at issue in this case.  
There is no 
suggestion of manipulation, nor would the facts support it.  The 
jurisdiction-destroying transfer 
of assets between the RTC and New Rock was an arms length transaction 
independent of the 
jurisdictional issue. Without the possibility of manipulative behavior, 
the primary policy behind 
the time of filing rule is not implicated.  
         Our rejection of an absolute time of filing requirement breaks no 
new ground.  
Courts that have considered the rule more fully have not hesitated to 
abandon it where 
appropriate.  In Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 
1985), the Fifth Circuit 
discussed the policies behind the time of filing rule and held that in a 
federal question case, 
where the plaintiff's amended complaint omitted federal counts included in 
the original 
complaint on which jurisdiction could be based, the court would look to 
the amended complaint 
and decline jurisdiction.  Id. at 508.  The Fifth Circuit interpreted this 
rule as consistent with the 
general principle that the amended complaint "supersedes the original and 
renders it of no legal 
effect, unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the 
earlier pleading."  Id. at 
508. 
         We were equally quick to reject the time of filing rule in Lovell 
Mfg. v. Export- 
Import Bank, 843 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1988):   
              Lovell . . . cites several older Third Circuit cases for the 
proposition that 
                   our determination of jurisdiction should be based 
solely on the basis of the 
                   pleadings, and not on subsequent events.  . . . We are 
uncertain that these 
                   cases stand for the broad proposition for which Lovell 
cites them.  
                   However, regardless of what they once might have stood 
for, and 
                   regardless of the merit of these principles elsewhere, 
plainly they do not 
                   reflect recent Third Circuit jurisprudence.  As Lovell 
itself concedes, later 
                   cases clearly hold that once all federal claims have 
been dropped from a 
                   case, the case simply does not belong in federal court. 
     Id. at 734 (citations omitted).  We concluded by observing "that to 
the extent a black-letter rule 
ever existed, precluding a court from relying on post-removal events . . 
., the Supreme Court 
clearly did not feel bound by it in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, ___ 
U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 614 
(1988)."  Id. at 735.  Although the time of filing rule certainly retains 
a large measure of 
persuasive efficacy, we read Lovell as a clear rejection of any iron-clad 
time of filing 
requirement.  Cf. Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 683-84 (3d Cir. 
1994) (federal 
jurisdiction arising from the involvement of the American Red Cross in a 
case will cease on the 
dismissal of the Red Cross from the case). 
         As a result, merely reciting the time of filing rule is not 
enough to support 
jurisdiction in this case.  Although invoking this general principle has 
some surface appeal, the 
rule rests on policies that are not served by its application to these 
facts.  There is also significant 
authority that supports our decision to diverge from it.  New Rock's black 
letter maxim will not 
give the federal courts the power to hear this state law claim. 
                                3. 
         We have concluded that once the RTC was dismissed from the case, 
jurisdiction 
in the district court could no longer rest on § 1441a(l)(1).  We now 
consider whether the district 
court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 
1367 after the RTC, 
the jurisdiction-conferring party, was dismissed and after the district 
court had invested 
considerable judicial resources and had resolved the case on its merits.  
We conclude that § 1367 
provided supplemental jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case.  
Our holding means 
only that the district court had the discretion to retain jurisdiction 
after the RTC was dismissed; it 
does not suggest that the district court was obligated to resolve the case 
after the RTC dismissed, 
nor does it even suggest that district courts should retain jurisdiction 
in similar situations. 
         The question before us has two components.  First, did Congress 
intend with 28 
U.S.C. § 1367 to provide the federal courts with the discretion to 
exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction in the situation that we face here?   Second, if this was 
Congress' intent, does this 
grant of jurisdiction exceed the scope of Article III of the United States 
Constitution?  Because it 
best introduces the issues involved in this case, we begin with the second 
question. 
         The district court had jurisdiction over this action at the 
outset of the litigation 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441a, which provides that any suit to which the 
RTC is a party "shall be 
deemed to arise under the laws of the United States."  This jurisdictional 
grant did not expand the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond that permissible under Article 
III.  Brockman v. 
Merabank, 40 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Osborn v. Bank of 
the United States, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824); American National Red Cross v. 
S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 
264, 112 S.Ct. 2465, 2475-6 (1993).  The question before us now is whether 
Congress could 
extend this jurisdiction to include cases to which the RTC was party, but 
is no longer, without 
exceeding the bounds of Article III. 
         The Supreme Court delineated the modern constitutional bounds of 
pendent 
jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).  In 
that opinion, the Court 
considered when federal courts have jurisdiction over state claims which 
are related to federal 
claims between the same parties, but over which the federal courts have no 
independent basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction.   The Court concluded that federal courts 
have the power to hear a 
state claim if the federal claim has "substance sufficient to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction on 
the court," and the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus 
of operative facts."  
383 U.S. at 725.  This question is ordinarily resolved on the pleadings.  
The decision to exercise 
this power, on the other hand, remains open, and should be based on 
considerations of "judicial 
economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants."  383 U.S. at 726-727.  
Once a court has 
decided to exercise jurisdiction over the state claim, however, 
elimination of the federal claim 
does not deprive the court of the constitutional power to adjudicate the 
pendent claim.  Lentino v. 
Fringe Emp. Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1979). 
     Can this continuing jurisdiction over a state claim exist when, 
rather than the 
federal claim being eliminated, the federal claim itself becomes a state 
claim?  The Supreme 
Court recently cited to Gibbs in a context analogous to the one with which 
we are faced.  In 
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) a bare 
majority of the 
Court held that under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort 
Compensation Act (the 
"Westfall Act"), the federal courts could review certification by the 
Attorney General that an 
employee sued for a wrongful or negligent act was acting within the scope 
of his or her 
employment or office at the time of incident.  If the Attorney General so 
certifies, the employee 
is dismissed from the action, the United States is substituted as the 
defendant, the case falls 
within the Federal Tort Claims Act.  If the case is not already in federal 
court, it is then removed 
from state court by the Attorney General.  115 S.Ct. at 2229, 2235.  Once 
in federal court the 
certification decision by the Attorney General is reviewable. 
     Article III comes into play in this situation because if the district 
court concludes 
that the employee acted outside the scope of employment and thus rejects 
the certification, the 
individual defendant must be resubstituted and the United States will no 
longer be a party.  If the 
parties are not diverse, the federal court could be left "with a case 
without a federal question to 
support the court's subject matter jurisdiction."  Id. at 2236.  Under the 
statute, the Attorney 
General's certification is conclusive for the purposes of removal, 
suggesting that even if  the 
certification is rejected by the federal court and the United States is no 
longer a party,  remand is 
not permissible.   Although Lamagno itself did not raise this issue 
because the parties were 
diverse, the Court considered whether the statute should be interpreted to 
avoid this potential 
constitutional problem. 
     A four justice plurality cited to Gibbs in concluding that any 
Article III problem 
was not "a grave one."  115 S.Ct. at 2236.  At the outset of the 
litigation, the Court reasoned, 
there was a significant federal question - whether the employee acted 
within the scope of his 
federal employment.  Resolving this question, the Court concluded, 
involved consideration of the 
facts relevant to the underlying tort claims, thus "‘considerations of 
judicial economy, 
convenience and fairness' [citation to Gibbs omitted] make it reasonable 
and proper for the 
federal court to proceed beyond the federal question to final judgment 
once it has invested time 
and resources."  Id. at 2237.   Therefore, even if the United States were 
replaced by a non-diverse 
party, and there was no other basis for federal jurisdiction, the federal 
court nonetheless retained 
jurisdiction over the case without running afoul of Article III. 
     Justice Souter dissented,  joined by three other Justices,  reasoning 
in part that 
"requiring" a federal court to keep jurisdiction over the case after the 
United States was no longer 
a party "must at least approach the limit [of ‘arising under' jurisdiction 
under Article III], if it 
does not cross the line."  Id. at 2239.  The certification question could 
not provide the basis for 
jurisdiction, according to the dissent, because that question itself was 
jurisdictional.  In part to 
avoid testing the limits of Article III, the dissent read the statute as 
prohibiting review of the 
Attorney General's certification by the district court. 
     In our case there was federal jurisdiction at the outset of the 
litigation - the 
presence of the RTC - which does not implicate the concerns of the dissent 
in Lomagno.  
Jurisdiction springs not from the question of jurisdiction itself, but 
from the involvement of the 
RTC.  Moreover, unlike the dissent's reading of the statute at issue in 
Lomagno, the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute at issue in this case does not "require" 
the district court to keep 
jurisdiction, it merely permits it to do so.  The considerations of 
"judicial economy, convenience 
and fairness" cited by the Lomagno plurality are particularly compelling 
in this case where the 
district court has completely resolved the dispute on its merits.  
Requiring the parties to re-try the 
case in state court would needlessly duplicate the resources expended by 
the federal courts.   We 
thus conclude that in such a case, where the jurisdiction-conferring party 
drops out and the 
federal court retains jurisdiction over what becomes a state law claim 
between non-diverse 
parties, the bounds of Article III have not been crossed.  See Garcia v. 
U.S., 88 F.3d 318, 324 
(5th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with Lomagno plurality that even after the 
United States was dismissed 
as party, Article III did not prevent federal court from resolving case on 
the merits); see alsoAliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 817 (1994) (holding 
Attorney General's certification reviewable and that the case could not be 
remanded if the 
certification was invalidated and the United States was no longer a 
party). 
     An analogy to diversity jurisdiction supports our conclusion.  In 
diversity cases a 
change in domicile that destroys the original basis for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction does not 
divest the federal courts of jurisdiction to continue to hear the case.  
Mullen v. Torrence, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 537 (1824);  Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164  
(1838).   We have rejected 
an iron-clad "time of filing rule" that federal jurisdiction at the outset 
of a case is dispositive as to 
jurisdiction throughout the case.  In rejecting the rule as dispositive, 
however, we do not suggest 
that jurisdiction at the outset of the case is irrelevant as to whether 
the district court continued to 
have jurisdiction after the RTC was dismissed.  Indeed it is the initial 
jurisdiction over the case 
that provides the constitutional power for the court to continue to hear 
it.  
     Finally, we note that a contrary conclusion would seriously limit the 
ability of 
Congress to provide a federal forum for litigation initiated by federally-
created entities.   For 
example, it would prevent Congress from deciding, after initially putting 
the case in federal 
court, that judicial economy required that that court have the discretion 
to keep the case.  
Congress would not even have the power to give continuing jurisdiction 
over the case for reasons 
related to the interests of the jurisdiction-conferring party.  In this 
case, for example, the RTC 
may have more difficulty disposing of its assets if the purchaser knows 
that any litigation 
concerning those assets must be started anew in state court.  Cf.  
Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v. K.N. 
Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428, 111 S.Ct. 858, 860 (1991) (using this 
reasoning to support the 
rule that diversity jurisdiction, once established, is not defeated by the 
addition of a non-diverse 
party).   We conclude that Article III does not require such a significant 
limitation on Congress' 
power to give jurisdiction to the federal courts of cases involving 
federally-created entities.   
     We now go to the second part of the inquiry.  We have determined that 
Congress 
had the power to permit this case to continue to be heard in federal 
court.  But is this what 
Congress intended under 28 U.S.C. § 1367?   We turn first to the language 
of section 1367(a) 
which provides:  
               (a)  Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as 
expressly provided 
                    otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of 
which the district courts 
                    have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall 
have supplemental 
                    jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related 
to claims in the action 
                    within such original jurisdiction that they form part 
of the same case or 
                    controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.  Such 
                    supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that 
involve the joinder of 
                    additional parties. 
      
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Under subsection (c), 
 
               the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a 
                    claim under subsection  (a) if-- 
                         (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of 
state 
                    law, 
                         (2) the claim substantially predominates over the 
                    claim or claims over which the district court has 
original 
                    jurisdiction, 
                         (3) the district court has dismissed all claims 
over 
                    which it has original jurisdiction, or 
                         (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other 
                    compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
     Id. (emphasis supplied). 
     Applying the statute to this case, we have pointed out that original 
jurisdiction 
pursuant to § 1441a(l)(1) existed when the RTC first filed this action.  
This satisfies § 1367(a).  
We have held that when the district court dismissed the RTC from the case, 
it no longer had 
jurisdiction under § 1441a(l)(1).  This transition triggers a 
discretionary decision on whether 
jurisdiction over a state law claim should be declined pursuant to § 
1367(c)(3).  The plain 
language of the statute makes declination permissive, not mandatory. 
     We recognize that Congress may not have contemplated the precise 
issue raised 
by this case when it drafted the supplemental jurisdiction statute.  
Section 1367 appears to 
address multiple state and federal claims growing out of the same case and 
controversy or 
existing between the parties.  Here, by contrast, we have a single claim 
that due to the accidents 
of circumstance has shifted mid-action from a claim arising under federal 
law to a claim existing 
under state law.  We believe, however, that the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute, particularly 
through its underlying purpose of judicial efficiency, extends to this 
case.  See Mill Investments 
Inc. v. Brooks Woolen Co. Inc., 797 F. Supp. 49,  51-53 (D.Me. 1992) 
(considering § 1367); see 
also Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Reimer & Kroger Assoc. Inc., 
61 F.3d 608, 611 
(8th Cir. 1995) (noting that after RTC removed case and was then 
dismissed, district court denied 
motion to remand to state court and asserted supplemental jurisdiction 
under § 1367).  We do not 
suggest, of course, that the district court would have erred had it 
dismissed the case after the 
RTC was no longer a party.  We decide only that this case comes within § 
1367(a) and the 
district court therefore had the discretion to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction after dismissal of 
the RTC. 
     Several factors support our conclusion.  First, the statute 
specifically provides that 
the federal court may decline (and by implication, may chose to exercise) 
jurisdiction over 
supplemental claims even when the "district court has dismissed all claims 
over which it has 
original jurisdiction." (emphasis supplied). § 1367(c)(3).  The situation 
which the statute 
specifically contemplates, in which the jurisdiction-conferring claims are 
"dismissed" and the 
court retains jurisdiction over the other claims, is difficult to 
distinguish from this case in which 
the jurisdiction-conferring party is dismissed.  In both situations the 
jurisdiction-conferring 
element of the case drops out, and the federal court is left with a state 
law claim.   
     Moreover, this case is not one in which the dismissal of the RTC 
meant that the 
case was never properly in federal court.  Congress put the case in 
federal court under  § 1441a, 
and in doing so acted well within the scope of Article III.  In applying § 
1367 we have suggested 
a distinction between dismissal of  a case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, which means 
that § 1367(a) may not apply at all,  and dismissal for failure to state a 
claim, which does not 
preclude application of § 1367(a).  See Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware 
Co., 983 F.2d 1277, 
1284 (3d Cir. 1993).  But Growth Horizons did not address the issue here - 
whether § 1367 
applies where the court  had subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of 
the case, but after the 
dismissal of a jurisdiction-conferring party no longer does.  In this 
case, we distinguish between 
jurisdictional defects that deprive the court of jurisdiction altogether, 
and those that arise only 
after the court has jurisdiction.  Cf. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company v. 
Powell, 87 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1996) (making this distinction in 
diversity cases); IMFC 
Professional, Etc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, 676 F.2d 152, 159 n.12 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (making 
this distinction in removal cases). 
     Second, the language and legislative history of § 1367(a) support its 
extension to 
the limits that Article III permits.  By its language § 1367(a) confers 
jurisdiction in mandatory 
terms to include those cases "which form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of 
the United States Constitution" (except as expressly excluded by statute 
or as provided for in 
subsections (b) and (c)).  As one commentator explained: 
          the conferral is in very broad terms, and by using the "case or 
controversy" 
          standard found in the Constitution's own statement of the outer 
limits of federal 
          jurisdiction, Congress indicates that it wants supplemental 
jurisdiction, at least in 
          the first instance - subject to its rejection as a matter of 
judicial discretion under 
          subdivision (c) - to go the constitutional limit, where it 
appeared to be carried in 
          the Gibbs case.  
     28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1993), David Siegal, Practice Commentary, "The 1990 
Adoption of § 1367, 
Codifying ‘Supplemental Jurisdiction'" at 831.  We have consistently read 
§ 1367(a) as 
codifying, (or in the area of pendant parties, expanding) the 
jurisdictional standard established in 
Gibbs. Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 
1995);  Sinclair v. 
Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 1991);  Lyon v. Whisman, 45 
F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 
1995).  
     The legislative history of  § 1367 supports the conclusion that 
subsection (a) was 
intended to grant supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of Article III.  
See Arthur D. Wolf, 
Codification of Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy of  a Legislative 
Proposal, 14 W. New Eng. 
L. Rev. 1, 23 (1992) (concluding that under § 1367 "the test of the reach 
of subsection (a) will be 
the scope of Article III.")  This history makes clear that the statute was 
passed in reaction to 
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 547 (1989), which held, in the context 
of pendent party 
jurisdiction, that the Court would not assume that Congress had intended 
the full constitutional 
power to hear the claim had been given to the federal courts, unless 
Congress passed specific 
legislation to that effect. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, 101st Congress, 2d 
Sess., reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802,  6874.  The House Report states that the purpose of the 
legislation was to 
restore jurisdiction in cases like Finley  and "essentially restore the 
pre-Finely understandings of 
the authorization for and limits on other forms of supplemental 
jurisdiction." Id.   
     The "pre-Finley" understanding of the authorization for supplemental 
jurisdiction 
was that "where Congress has not spoken to the contrary or where we cannot 
find Congressional 
intent to the contrary, jurisdictional statutes give federal courts the 
power to exercise ancillary 
and pendent jurisdiction to the constitutional limit."  Ambromovage v. 
United Mine Workers, 
726 F.2d 972, 991 n.57 (3d Cir. 1984).   This was the approach taken in 
United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966):  the Court looked to the constitutional 
limits on pendent 
jurisdiction and assumed that the federal courts' power extended to those 
limits, without looking 
for a specific grant of statutory authority.  The language of § 1367(a) 
stating that it applies 
"except as expressly provided otherwise by federal statute" (emphasis 
supplied) and that it shall 
"include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional 
parties," confirms this 
reading of the statute. 
     We express no opinion as to whether § 1367 should be read broadly in 
cases other 
than the one before us,  but here it is particularly appropriate because 
the district court resolved 
this case on its merits and the risk of needless expenditures of judicial 
resources is accordingly a 
very real one.  Lentino v. Fringe Emp. Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 479 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  The 
Supreme Court relied on similar reasoning when it rejected the argument 
that because an original 
constitutional claim was dismissed as moot, the district court should not 
have resolved the 
pendent claim: 
          We are not willing to defeat the common sense policy of pendent 
jurisdiction - the 
          conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance of 
multiciplicity of litigation - 
          by a conceptual approach that would require jurisdiction over 
the primary claim at 
          all stages as a prerequisite to the resolution of the pendent 
claim. 
           
     Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 (1970). 
     Accordingly, although we are mindful that jurisdictional statutes 
must be 
construed narrowly, Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934), we are also 
mindful that it is our 
obligation to effectuate the intentions of Congress in interpreting those 
statutes.  Here, those 
intentions are clear from the face of the statute and the legislative 
history, and they require that 
the statute be read broadly to retain jurisdiction in this case in which 
substantial judicial 
resources have produced a final decision on the merits.  
     Finally, § 1367 has been read by the Fourth Circuit to provide 
jurisdiction in an 
analogous situation arising in diversity.  Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 
106 (4th Cir. 1995).  In 
that case, after the court granted summary judgment on one of the 
plaintiff's claims, the amount 
in controversy fell below the $50,000 required for federal jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
The district court concluded that it no longer had subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The Fourth Circuit 
disagreed, concluding that pursuant to § 1367 the court had supplemental 
jurisdiction over the 
remaining claims. Id. at 109.  In that case, like this one, the 
jurisdictional basis for the claim 
dropped out; there was no claim to which the state claims were 
supplemental because jurisdiction 
was premised on the aggregate of amount in controversy involved in all the 
claims that were 
asserted at the outset.  When one claim dropped out, this basis for 
federal jurisdiction no longer 
existed.  The court reasoned, however, that the statute applies when the 
amount in controversy 
falls below $50,000 just as it does when a federal question drops out of 
the case:   
          ...the same basic pattern of circumstances exists in both 
contexts: the 
          jurisdictional basis of the action fades away and the court is 
left with what would 
          otherwise be a state law case.  There is no way to distinguish a 
reduction of the 
          amount in controversy from the disappearance of a federal claim 
as contemplated 
          under 1367(c). Indeed the factors applicable in the typical 
pendent jurisdiction 
          case are equally applicable here -- comity, the existence of a 
state limitations bar, 
          and considerations of judicial economy.  Whenever the basis for 
federal 
          jurisdiction evaporates, Congress has provided for discretion. 
                
           
     Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110; see also Clarke v. Whitney, 934 F. Supp. 
148, 151 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (following Shanaghan). 
     Based on these considerations, we conclude that the district court 
had 
supplemental jurisdiction over this case after it dismissed the RTC.  When 
the RTC was 
dismissed from the action, the district court should have considered 
supplemental jurisdiction as 
the statutory basis to decide issues which had been fully presented to the 
court.  Given the district 
court's failure to consider § 1367, we would generally remand the case to 
the district court for 
further proceedings on the supplemental jurisdiction issue.  See Growth 
Horizons, Inc. v. 
Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (3d Cir. 1993) (remanding for 
consideration of 
supplemental jurisdiction after holding that jurisdiction existed over 
primary federal claim).  In 
light of the posture of the current dispute, however, we will dispense 
with remand, hold that 
supplemental jurisdiction exists, and affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment.  SeeSinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 604 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (reversing district court's finding of 
no federal jurisdiction over maritime personal injury action; holding that 
supplemental 
jurisdiction existed over state law claims); Sparks v. Hershey, 661 F.2d 
30, 34 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(reversing district court's dismissal of state law claims as abuse of 
discretion and directing court 
to exercise jurisdiction over them). 
     In the instant case, the district court has already entered summary 
judgment for 
New Rock.  That record is before us on appeal.  We find no merit in 
Preferred Entity's challenges 
to the grant of summary judgment.  Preferred Entity has never contested 
the validity of the 
mortgage, the existence of a default, or the acceleration of the 
indebtedness.  Preferred Entity has 
never even contested the information in New Rock's affidavits or the 
specific amount due.  
Preferred Entity objects only to the legal sufficiency of the records to 
support a summary 
judgment motion, contending that New Rock's affidavits contain only 
inadmissible hearsay.  
     We have reviewed the contours of the personal knowledge requirement 
of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e) and the business records exception of Fed. R. Ev. 803(6).  
See, e.g., Colgan v. 
Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1423 (3d Cir.) (discussing Rule 
56(e)), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 941 (1991); In re Japanese Elec. Products. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 
238, 288-89 (3d Cir. 
1983) (discussing Fed. R. Ev. 803(6)), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 
574 (1986).  We believe 
the documents were properly considered.  We find no genuine issue of 
material fact.  Absent the 
jurisdictional hurdle, we would not hesitate to affirm the district court. 
     Given the fact that the district court has effectively resolved the 
case, we feel a 
rejection of supplemental jurisdiction would be inappropriate.  See Growth 
Horizons, 983 F.2d at 
1284-85 (emphasizing need to consider "judicial economy, convenience, and 
fairness to the 
litigants" in remanding to district court for consideration of 
supplemental jurisdiction over state 
law claim after trial on the merits); Sparks v. Hershey, 661 F.2d at 33 
("[W]e are inclined to 
believe that the dictates of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to 
the parties, and comity are 
better served by recognizing [supplemental] jurisdiction.") (citations 
omitted).  Indeed, we might 
reverse any such rejection as an abuse of discretion.  See Development 
Fin. Corp. v. Alpha 
Housing & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1995); but see Lyon 
v. Whisman, 45 
F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1995) (declining supplemental jurisdiction and 
dismissing case after trial 
on merits).  We also recognize that New Rock has made substantial 
expenditures of time and 
effort in foreclosing on the property.  We see no need to remand this case 
for a pro formaexercise of supplemental jurisdiction and a renewed appeal 
on the summary judgment order.  We 
will ground jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and affirm the district 
court.  See Sinclair, 935 F.2d 
at 602-03; Sparks v. Hershey, 681 F.2d at 34. 
                               IV. 
     For these reasons, the portion of the district court's order 
exercising jurisdiction 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1) will be reversed.  The district 
court's entry of summary 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
  I agree that the foreclosure sale has not mooted this appeal, and I 
therefore join in 
Part III.A of the majority opinion.  However, even assuming arguendo that 
the majority correctly 
concludes that the RTC's dismissal defeated federal jurisdiction, I cannot 
agree that we can 
uphold the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over this state law 
foreclosure action. Although 
Congress may well be able to provide for a federal court to retain 
jurisdiction over state law 
claims once the RTC was dismissed here, that is not the issue. The 
majority states that "[t]he 
question before us now is whether Congress could extend this jurisdiction 
to include cases to 
which the RTC was a party, but is no longer, without exceeding the bounds 
of Article III." Maj. 
Op. at 29. Having gone in at the wrong place, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the majority has 
come out at the wrong place. The question posed is not the issue.  Rather, 
the question is whether 
Congress did so extend this jurisdiction.  Our inquiry, though simply 
stated, is not so simply 
resolved. We need to determine if Congress intended to so extend our 
jurisdiction when it 
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  For the reasons that follow, I conclude that it 
did not, and I therefore 
must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
  In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides as follows: 
                    (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or 
as expressly 
                    provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil 
action of which 
                    the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall 
                    have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 
that are so 
                    related to claims in the action within such original 
jurisdiction that 
                    they form part of the same case or controversy under . 
. . the 
                    Constitution.  
           
28 U.S.C § 1367(a) (emphasis added).  Under the statute as drafted a court 
can exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction only if it has original jurisdiction. If it does 
not have jurisdiction over 
the underlying claim there is nothing to supplement. Here, the majority 
first holds that the "Time 
of Filing" rule does not apply and concludes that the district court lost 
subject matter jurisdiction 
once the RTC was dismissed. However, it then proceeds to declare that the 
court nevertheless has 
original jurisdiction, and can therefore exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction because jurisdiction 
originally attached when the RTC was a party. It can not be both ways.  If 
the "Time of Filing" 
rule does apply, the district court had jurisdiction to enter summary 
judgment. That jurisdiction, 
however, must arise not from the supplemental jurisdiction conferred in 28 
U.S.C. § 1367, but 
from the substantive grant of jurisdiction contained in the Financial 
Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(1)(1) ("FIRREA"). 
If the "Time of 
Filing" rule does not apply, there is no federal jurisdiction for any 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1367 to supplement.  
  In holding to the contrary, the majority relies heavily upon Gutierrez 
de Martinez 
v. Lamagno, _____  U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 227 (1995), however that case did 
not involve 
supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367, and is therefore inapposite 
to the inquiry here. The 
issue in Lamagno was the scope of the jurisdictional grant that Congress 
intended under the 
Westfall Act. Under that Act if a federal employee is sued, the Attorney 
General certifies 
whether or not the employee was acting within the scope of his or her 
federal employment at the 
time of the injury that forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim. If the 
Attorney General certifies 
that the individual was within the scope of his or her employment, the 
United States is 
substituted as a party, and the action is removed to federal court. If the 
Attorney General certifies 
to the contrary, the United States is not substituted as a party, and the 
action remains in state 
court, absent some other basis for federal jurisdiction. In Lamagno, an 
issue arose as to whether a 
federal court can review the certification of the Attorney General. 
Although the Court did discuss 
the parameters of the judicial power contained in Article III, the 
decision had nothing to do with 
supplemental jurisdiction. Indeed, the statute was never cited. The same 
is true of Garcia v. U.S., 
88 F3d 318 (5th Cir., 1996) which the majority also relies upon. That case 
was also decided 
under the Westfall Act, however, it had the further dimension of 
determining whether a federal 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying dispute if a 
court reversed the 
Attorney General's certification and concluded that the United States 
could not be substituted as 
a party. The court stated  
                    [w]e agree with the Lamagno plurality that, because of 
the 
                    Attorney General's certification, there is an initial 
colorable federal 
                    question.  Accordingly, we agree likewise that there 
is no 'grave' 
                    Article III problem in a district court retaining 
jurisdiction after 
                    rejecting the Attorney General's certification. 
          Garcia, 88 F3d. at 325.  However, that conclusion was based upon 
a very technical parsing of the 
precise language of the statute.  Thus, resolution of jurisdictional 
issues under the statutory 
framework of the Westfall Act does not advance our inquiry under 28 U.S. 
C. § 1367 nearly so 
far as the majority concludes.  The same is true of nearly all of the 
authority that the majority 
relies upon for its holding as to supplemental jurisdiction. 
  Surprisingly, the majority cites Mullen v. Torrance. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
537 
(1824) and Clarke v. Mathewson 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164 (1838) to suggest 
that section 1367 
provides supplemental jurisdiction because the court had jurisdiction at 
the outset of the 
litigation. See Maj. Op. at 34.  Those cases strongly suggest that the 
majority is in error in not 
relying upon the "Time of Filing" rule in determining if jurisdiction was 
lost when the RTC was 
dismissed.  In Mullen, the Supreme Court stated "[i]t is quite clear, that 
the jurisdiction of the 
Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, 
and that after vesting, it 
cannot be ousted by subsequent events." 22 U.S. at 539. Similarly, in 
Clarke, the Court noted  
                    It has not been the course of the courts of the United 
States to 
                    consider their jurisdiction, after it has once 
attached, as taken away 
                    by the subsequent change of residence of the party. A 
suit properly 
                    commenced between citizens of different states still 
proceeds; 
                    although the parties may, before its termination, 
become citizens of 
                    the same state. 
           
37 U.S. at 167.  In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab, 303 U.S. 
283 (1938) the 
Supreme Court reiterated the "Time of Filing" rule as first pronounced in 
Mullen. In Red Cab, 
the Court held that jurisdiction must be established from the good faith 
averments on the face of 
the complaint, and once established it is not defeated by subsequent 
events. "Events occurring 
subsequent to the institution  of suit which reduce the amount recoverable 
below the statutory 
limit do not oust jurisdiction." 303 U.S. at 289.  This precedent does not 
support the majority's 
holding under section 1367, and it undermines the majority's reasoning for 
rejecting the "Time of 
Filing" rule. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that this precedent can 
properly be limited to 
diversity jurisdiction as the majority suggests, the majority's reasoning 
still leaves a court free to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it has no jurisdiction to 
supplement.  
         More recently in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 
(1992) (See Maj. 
op. at 34, n.9) the Supreme Court again upheld the "Time of Filing" rule 
in rejecting the idea that 
the standing of parties who were added after litigation was begun could 
create a sufficient case or 
controversy for Art III jurisdiction even if the original plaintiffs 
lacked standing.  
                    The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily 
depends on the facts 
                    as they exist when the complaint is filed. . . . It 
cannot be that, by 
                    later participating in the suit, the State Department 
and AID 
                    retroactively created the redressability (and hence 
jurisdiction) that 
                    did not exist at the outset . . . There is no support 
for the dissent's 
                    novel contention, . . . that Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil 
                    Procedure, . . . somehow alters our longstanding rule 
that 
                    jurisdiction is to be assessed under the facts 
existing when the 
                    complaint is filed. 
           
405 U.S. at 569.  
 
         However, if the "Time of Filing" rule does not apply here, it is 
nevertheless clear 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not intend that a federal court exercise 
jurisdiction over a state law 
claim unless the federal claim that the state claim supplements is 
properly before the court.  I do 
not think that the Congress intended to allow the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction to resolve a 
uniquely state claim where, as here, the federal court concludes that it 
has no original federal 
jurisdiction.  We are, after all, interpreting a jurisdictional statute.  
                    The policy of the statute calls for its strict 
construction. . . . Due 
                    regard for the rightful independence of state 
governments, which 
                    should actuate federal courts requires that they 
scrupulously 
                    confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits 
which the statute 
                    has defined. 
          Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934). 
         This is not a case where there are federal claims and state 
claims that "derive from 
a common nucleus of operative facts. . . such that [a plaintiff] would 
ordinarily be expected to try 
them all in one judicial proceeding."  United Mine Workers of America v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
725 (1966).  Gibbs is the source of the "modern doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction", Carnegie- 
Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348 (1988), and it teaches 
that, under the appropriate 
circumstances, a federal district court possesses the discretionary power 
to decide claims based 
on state law.  Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725-726.  As the majority notes, the 
doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction is now codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute.  28 
U.S.C. § 1367.  
However, as noted above, that jurisdiction only exists in civil actions 
"of which the district courts 
have original jurisdiction."  Thus, the only way the majority can justify 
its contrary result is by 
relying upon the very "Time of Filing" rule that it rejects in the first 
instance. 
         Nor is this a question of abuse of discretion where a court 
properly has discretion 
to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.  We are confronted with an 
error of law arising from 
what I believe is an erroneous application of a legal principle occasioned 
by an incorrect reading 
of the supplemental jurisdiction statute.  I think it clear that the 
district court's action can not 
survive the plenary review we must give it. Accordingly, the majority's 
emphasis on the fact that 
the district court has already invested a great deal of time and resource 
in adjudicating this matter 
is irrelevant. It is axiomatic that a federal court cannot give itself 
jurisdiction where none exists. 
Although the resources that the district court has invested in resolving 
this case would most 
certainly be relevant to an exercise of the court's discretion to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction 
of a case properly before it, it is irrelevant to the question of whether 
the court had jurisdiction 
over the state law claims to begin with. The original subject matter 
jurisdiction that is the 
condition precedent for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction can not 
be conferred by 
considerations of convenience and efficiency.  
         The majority's interpretation of 28 U.S. C. § 1367 is even more 
perplexing given 
the recognition of the unique state interests that are implicated in a 
foreclosure action, and the 
limited scope of federal jurisdiction.  
                     
                    our reading of the statute is consistent with the 
purpose of FIRREA 
                    as expressed in the statute and its legislative 
history.  We also note 
                    that our reading is consistent with general policies 
underlying 
                    federal jurisdiction.  These principles include the 
limited nature of 
                    federal jurisdiction and the goal of not interfering 
in the business of 
                    the states. 
                      The limited nature of federal jurisdiction needs 
little discussion. 
                    This principle marks a fundamental precept of the 
American court 
                    system. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 
365, 374 
                    (1978). Interpreting [FIRREA] narrowly comports with 
this 
                    general rule.  
                     
          Maj. op. at 22.  Here again, the majority attempts to have its 
analytical pie and eat it too.  
However, I fail to see how the majority can justify giving a narrow 
interpretation to the 
jurisdictional inquiry under FIRREA (and thereby departing from Mullan and 
its progeny) while 
giving such an expansive interpretation to section 1367.  
         Here, the RTC had no interest in the New Jersey real estate that 
was the subject of 
the mortgage lien, nor was the RTC a promisee under any instruments that 
created the disputed 
indebtedness.  The RTC is merely a successor in interest to some of the 
parties to the original 
lawsuit.  That suit was actually initiated in state court by private 
entities that had an interest in 
the litigation. The RTC then removed it to state court, but is no longer a 
party.  Now, through 
dubious reasoning, we allow the federal court to which this state action 
was removed to 
adjudicate purely state claims that are unconnected to the RTC or any 
other federal agency.   
         New Rock's Amended Complaint avers: 
              3.        Plaintiff, New Rock, is the sole 
              owner and holder of all right, title and interest in the 
              Indebtedness .. . pursuant to the Mortgage 
              Assignments . . . 
              31.       New Rock has succeeded to all of 
              RTC's right title and interest . . . . 
See Maj. op. at 4.  If that is so, I do not understand how 28 U.S. C. § 
1367 can be interpreted to 
allow a federal court to adjudicate New Rock's dispute.  Indeed, the 
analytical sleight of hand 
that allows the majority to rely upon the very principles it rejects has 
the end result of giving us 
the "jurisdiction by contract" it tried to avoid in refusing to apply the 
"Time of Filing" rule in the 
first instance. Id.  at 10. ("[T]he RTC cannot pass its jurisdictional 
rights by contract.") 
         Accordingly, I cannot join in the majority opinion. 
